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1. Introduction 
When protecting innovations through patents, firms face a trade-off between disclosing 
information and obtaining a temporary monopoly for commercialising their inventions (Hall 
et al., 2014). Since disclosing information may help competitors to develop competing 
innovations based on a similar technological approach, firms may opt to keep their inventions 
secret. Theoretical studies show that the choice between patenting and secrecy depends on a 
variety of factors, including the strength of the protection instrument, the nature of the 
innovation and the ease of imitation, as well as market structure, firm capabilities and 
competitor strategies (see Anton and Yao, 2004; Kultti et al., 2006, 2007; Mosel, 2011; 
Panagopoulos and Park, 2015; Ottoz and Cugno, 2011). Empirical studies frequently find that 
firms favour secrecy over patenting (Levin et al., 1987; Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999; 
Cohen et al., 2000, 2002; Hall et al., 2013) and consider the former to be more effective than 
patenting (Arundel, 2001).  
While many theoretical studies treat patenting and secrecy as substitutes for one another, firm 
practices rather suggest that both protection methods are used simultaneously. At a firm level, 
provided that the two methods are employed for different innovations, this is straightforward. 
But firms may also choose to mix both strategies at the level of individual innovations by 
protecting some elements of a technology through patents and keeping others secret 
(Belleflamme and Bloch, 2014). For example, if innovations involve both codified and tacit 
knowledge, firms may patent the codified knowledge and keep the tacit knowledge secret 
(Arora, 1997). Firms may also combine patenting and secrecy in a way that enables them to 
keep the codified part of an invention secret, whilst maintaining the option of later patenting 
the invention (Graham, 2004).  
In this paper, we empirically analyse the choice of innovating firms to protect their 
innovations through patenting and/or secrecy, and whether this choice affects innovation 
success and firm performance. Starting from propositions of theoretical models on the 
interaction between patenting and secrecy, we investigate a number of factors that are said to 
influence the use of the two protection mechanisms. A particular focus is placed on 
preferences for either patents or secrecy, and the factors affecting the choice for a combined 
protection strategy. Though we are not able to conduct our analysis at the level of individual 
innovations, we are fortunate to have information about the number of different innovations 
introduced by a firm. This allows us to investigate the interaction of patenting and secrecy for 
firms with a single innovation and the performance impacts of the chosen protection strategy. 
Similarly to Hall et al. (2013), we explore three types of relationships: (i) the determinants of 
a firm’s decision to protect its innovations through patents, secrecy, or both, (ii) the impact of 
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the chosen protection strategy on innovation performance, and (iii) the profitability 
implications of the protection strategy. We rely on data from the German innovation survey, a 
panel survey (“Mannheim Innovation Panel”) which constitutes the German contribution to 
the European Commission’s Community Innovation Surveys. We complement this data with 
information on firms’ patent applications from the European Patent Office and the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation. In contrast to previous empirical studies, we are able to 
exploit the panel nature of our data base in order to analyse innovation performance impacts 
for both product and process innovations, and to estimate the effects of patent and trade 
secrets on firm profitability. 
The paper is organised as follows: In the next section we derive hypotheses on determinants 
of patenting and/or secrecy from theoretical and empirical literature. In Section 3, the data 
used is described, and descriptive results are presented. In Section 4, we present and discuss 
the results of our model estimations before providing a conclusion in Section 5. 
2. Literature and Hypotheses  
In a recent literature survey, Hall et al. (2014) summarised the main results of theoretical and 
empirical work on firms’ choices to protect their innovations through various formal and 
informal methods. Building upon these results, and considering some more recent literature, 
we derive six hypotheses on the determinants of patenting and secrecy as protection 
mechanisms for innovation. 
H1. Strength of IP law 
An obvious, though often studied determinant of the use of patenting and secrecy as 
protection methods, is the effectiveness of patent and trade secrets law. The choice of 
patenting over secrecy is certainly affected by the probability that innovators can effectively 
protect their innovation from infringement by patent law. On the other hand, a strong trade 
secrets law encourages firms to rely on this protection method. In a theoretical model, Kultti 
et al. (2007) demonstrate that an effective patent system stimulates patenting particularly 
where firms expect that other firms will develop similar inventions. Secrecy is preferred only 
if innovators can be quite sure that they are the sole innovators. Denicolò and Franzoni (2004) 
consider the length of patent protection and prior-user rights. Longer patent life implies a 
higher propensity to patent for first inventors, while prior-user rights would foster innovation 
in highly competitive markets.  
Dass et al. (2015) empirically analyse the role of the relative protection provided by patent 
and trade secrets law in the US. They find that the strengthening of trade secret law by U.S. 
states led to fewer patent applications, increased opaqueness, greater stock illiquidity, and 
worse announcement reaction to seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). In contrast, the 
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implementation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) was followed by an increase in patenting, enhanced transparency, greater stock 
liquidity, and a less negative stock-market reaction to SEOs. Png (2012) studied the impact of 
changes in U.S. trade secrets law on firms’ R&D investment and found a negative effect in 
low technology industries; and a positive effect in high technology industries. In a study 
relying on historical data of innovations presented at four global fairs in the second half of the 
nineteenth and in the early twentieth century, Moser (2012) showed a substantial variation in 
the use of patenting across sectors which could be linked to differences in effectiveness of 
patenting and secrecy in these sectors at that time. 
The role of patent law as an incentive to use patenting becomes more complex in the case of 
innovations that are subject to patent thickets and if licensing is a strategic option. Theoretical 
models suggest that patenting is relatively more attractive than secrecy in such situations. 
Panagopoulos and Park (2015) look at this strategic capacity of patents and show that patents 
are preferred over secrecy as they can foster technology transfer by both creating and 
resolving an IP conflict. Kwon (2012a) considers the situation of patent thickets, i.e. when 
firms compete for multiple complementary patents (i.e. operating in a patent thicket). In such 
a case, patent protection will result in a decrease in the R&D investment of firms. In contrast, 
if firms compete over a single innovation, patent protection will result in an increase in R&D 
investment. In the case of licensing, and when the propensity of patenting is small, 
strengthening patent protection can decrease the incentive for firms to innovate (Kwon, 
2012b). Licensing is also considered by Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006), who analyse the 
choice between an open sale after knowledge has been patented, and a closed sale which 
precludes further disclosure. Contracting parties will choose the closed sale whenever the 
interim knowledge is more valuable and leakage is sufficiently high. 
H2. Degree of innovation competition 
The assumption of a sole innovator in the model of Kultti et al. (2007) is rarely found in 
practice. Most technological markets are characterised by a larger number of firms with 
similar innovative capacities, which often enter into R&D races for the fastest technological 
solutions (Lemley, 2012). The degree of innovation competition is commonly seen as a driver 
for patenting. Where there is the possibility of simultaneous invention, the first inventor will 
opt for patenting, thereby disadvantaging the others. In contrast, if an innovator has a large 
technological lead over its competitors, and expects to maintain this lead by soon generating 
new inventions, the lead innovator will prefer secrecy to patenting (Schneider, 2008; Zaby, 
2010). Kultti et al. (2006) present a theoretical model in which patenting is preferred over 
secrecy, particularly when firms can expect that other firms will develop similar inventions. 
Other models stress the choice of neither patenting nor secrecy in patent races, but rather 
voluntary disclosure as a strategy. Gill’s (2008) model demonstrates that an innovator with a 
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lead over its competitor opts for strategic disclosure in order to persuade the competitor to exit 
the patent race. Ponce (2007) shows that the innovator may opt for secrecy, but will disclose 
some knowledge to prevent a potential second innovator from developing the same innovation 
and patenting it. Zhang (2012) investigates the impact of innovation arrival rates and the 
number of firms competing for innovations. Firms that innovate early are more inclined to 
choose secrecy. A higher innovation arrival rate will increase the incentives to patent, while 
an increase in the number of firms may cause patenting to occur earlier if the strength of 
patent protection is high. 
H3. Level of innovation  
In their seminal paper, Anton and Yao (2004) model the role of the degree of innovation in 
terms of small vs. major innovations. They demonstrate that in a model with an innovator and 
a competitor with less innovative capacity, major innovations are not patented but kept secret 
to prevent imitation by competitors. Pajak (2010) uses data from the French innovation survey 
and finds, albeit for a very small sample of firms, that smaller innovations are patented while 
secrecy is used to protect large innovations. In a similar paper, which assumes competitors 
have the same innovative capacity as the innovator, Mosel (2011) demonstrates that it is 
rather major innovations that are patented, while patenting small innovations does not pay-off 
due to high filing costs. These results would imply that the impact of the level of innovation 
on patenting and secrecy will depend on the competitors’ innovative capacity. There are few 
empirical studies on this issue. Arora et al. (2008) show that most innovations are not worth 
patenting, but for those it is, patent protection stimulates R&D. Hall et al. (2013) find that 
firms involved in R&D are more likely to rely on patenting than innovators that do not 
perform R&D (and will hence have a lower level of technological novelty contained in their 
innovations). The historical study by Moser (2012) found that patented innovations were 
more often awarded a prize, indicating that more valuable innovations were more frequently 
patented.  
H4. Type of innovation  
Patenting is also preferred over secrecy if the threat of imitation, e.g. by reverse-engineering, 
is high. In this case, applying for a patent and hence disclosing details about the invention in 
the patent document would reveal no more information than one could obtain from looking at 
the innovation. In contrast, if rivals could substantially learn from the information provided in 
the patent document but could not reverse-engineer the innovation, firms would opt for 
secrecy (Hall and Harhoff, 2012). In general, reverse-engineering is easier to apply to product 
innovations. For process innovations that have been developed in-house, and that are not 
traded, reverse-engineering is largely impossible. For that reason, process innovation will be 
more likely subject to secrecy while product innovations will be more often protected by 
patenting. In a theoretical model, Biswas and McHardy (2012) analyse the circumstances 
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under which process innovators will opt for patenting instead of secrecy, even if secrecy is 
costless. They find that low-cost firms are more likely to opt for patenting. High-cost firms 
will use patenting only if they can profitably bluff and pass themselves off as a low-costs firm 
in the market. The incentive to patent rather than maintain secrecy, increases as the 
probability that the rival firm is a low-cost firm falls, and as the proportion of cost reduction 
obtained by the rival firm through innovation declines after the underline patent has expired.  
H5. Open innovation practices  
The way in which firms organise the innovation process is likely to have impacts on their 
protection strategy. In the literature, there are two views as to how external knowledge 
sourcing and the choice of protection methods is linked (Arora et al., 2015). The “spillover 
prevention” approach stresses that collaborating firms favour patenting in order to control 
spillovers to external partners (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002), while adopting a secrecy 
strategy is more difficult when firms are engaged in collaboration (Giarratana and Mariani, 
2014). Buss and Pukert (2015) found that firms which outsource R&D are more likely to 
suffer from IP infringement. Patenting may also be used by firms following an open 
innovation strategy in order to signal the firm’s innovative capabilities to potential 
cooperation partners (Alexy et al., 2009; Hagedoorn and Ridder, 2012). The “organisation 
openness” approach argues that collaborating firms will rather refrain from patenting in order 
to reduce collaboration with external actors (Laursen and Salter, 2014) as keeping knowledge 
in-house may impede collaborative knowledge-creating processes. There is some evidence 
that firms deliberately disclose certain knowledge to the general public (“selective revealing”) 
in order to spur complementary innovations (Alexy et al., 2013; Henkel et al., 2014). In 
addition, the strategic use of secrecy has been supported by the emergence of thorough 
secrecy management in firms (Bos et al., 2015). 
There are empirical results to support both views. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), Cosh et al. 
(2011), Zobel et al. (2013) and Huang et al. (2014) find a positive relation between openness 
and patenting. Arora et al. (2015) show that patenting due to openness is higher amongst 
technologically leading firms, while firms focussing on incremental innovations are less 
willing to patent. Arundel (2001) finds only weak evidence that participation in cooperative 
R&D increases the returns of a patent-based protection strategy for product innovations as 
compared to a secrecy strategy. Laursen and Salter (2014) investigate the “paradox of 
openness”. While the creation of innovations often requires openness, their commercialization 
necessitates their protection. Their empirical analysis shows a concave relation between 
openness and appropriability. Openness first increases with the strength of the appropriability 
strategy, before displaying the opposite trend. Jensen and Webster (2007) find that firms 
conducting internal R&D and relying upon secrecy and patenting to protect their innovations 
are less likely to engage in external knowledge exchange. Another study by Arora et al. 
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(2015) shows that firms relying on customers and suppliers for their inventions are less likely 
to patent the focal invention whereas knowledge sourcing from universities and R&D 
suppliers increases patenting. 
H6. Financial constrains  
Applying for patents and monitoring potential infringements is costly. Firms with financial 
constraints may hence opt for protection methods which imply lower costs, such as secrecy. 
Graham et al. (2009), as well as Cordes et al. (1999), have found that the most significant 
reason why start-ups and small high-tech firms refrain from patenting are the costs involved. 
The study by Hall et al. (2013) carried out using data from the UK innovation survey, found 
that firms reporting financial constraints on their innovative activity tend to prefer secrecy 
over patenting. In addition, patenting is often subject to economies of scale;larger businesses 
therefore tend to make greater use of patents (Lerner, 1995; Arundel and Kabla, 1998).  
Combining patenting and secrecy 
While much of the literature considers patenting and secrecy as substitutes for one another, or 
even as mutually exclusive protection strategies, they can also complement one another (Hall 
et al., 2014; Arora, 1997). Graham (2004) argues that firms may keep the codified part of an 
invention secret, while maintaining the option to later patent the invention. Hegde et al. 
(2009) stress the role of continuations in patenting which allow individual claims to be 
altered, thereby extending secrecy with regard to specific claims. In their empirical study, 
Graham and Hedge (2014) find that a small fraction of U.S. patent applications (7.5%) use a 
provision to keep their inventions secret before a patent is granted. Small inventors are more 
likely to prefer disclosure through the patent document over secrecy for their most important 
inventions.  
In a theoretical model, Belleflamme and Bloch (2014) analyse the conditions under which 
innovators may choose to combine patenting and secrecy as protection strategy in case of 
complex innovations and an imitation risk. Such a situation will occur if the imitator is 
required to learn about a large proportion of the innovation in order to be able to usefully 
exploit it. Otherwise, the innovator will choose to either patent the entire innovation, or keep 
it secret in its entirety. Mixing patents and trade secrets was also analysed by Ottoz and 
Cugno (2008, 2011) and Cugno and Ottoz (2006). They demonstrate that in a situation that 
allows a single innovation to be protected both by patents and trade secrets, strengthening 
patent breadth may induce a lower level of patenting as innovators will rely on secrecy. 
Where the part of the technology kept secret is highly relevant for the economic performance 
of an innovation, and the costs involved in duplicating the innovation are sufficiently high, 
protection via a strong trade secret is preferable as it saves duplication costs. In addition, 
secrecy is superior over patents due to the lack of an independent invention defence in patent 
law. 
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The hybrid use of patents and trade secrets has also been studied from a legal perspective. 
Perng Pan and Mion (2010) illustrate that an appropriate combination of these two protection 
methods is particularly important where aspects of green technology can be partitioned into 
different segments, some of which are easy to re-design or replicate, and some which are not. 
Erkal (2004) stresses that trade secret law complements patent law in earlier stages of the 
innovation process by allowing innovators to work on their ideas until they become 
patentable. Afterwards, the two protection methods become substitutes for one another.  
Patenting, secrecy and firm performance 
Effective protection of innovations should give innovators a performance premium as they are 
then able to prevent others from imitating their innovation. It should hold for all types of 
protection methods, that effectively protected innovations enjoyed higher levels of innovation 
success. There are rather few empirical studies investigating this relationship. Hussinger 
(2006) used German innovation data and found that sales from product innovations are higher 
for firms rating patents as important for protecting their innovations. She does not observe a 
significant impact from secrecy on new product sales. Hall et al. (2013) use UK innovation 
data and identify a strong impact of patents (as well as trade marks) on sales from new-to-the-
market innovations, but no impact on innovations that were only new to the firm. Informal 
protection methods, including secrecy, have a positive impact on both categories of product 
innovations, though the effect on new-to-firm innovations is lower and less significant. These 
findings suggest that patent protection is better suited to effectively preventing competitors 
from imitating an innovation. It would also seem that firms overrate the effectiveness of 
secrecy as a protection method, perhaps because they lack a reference value for innovation 
success when using patent protection.  
The impacts of patenting on firm performance have received significant attention in empirical 
research since the seminal paper by Griliches (1981). Griliches found a positive impact of a 
firm’s patent stock on the market value of publicly listed firms. Other studies support this 
result. Hanel (2008) uses data from the Canadian innovation survey and finds a positive 
impact of IP protection on profitability. Czarnitzki and Kraft (2010) analyse German 
innovation data and find that a firm’s patent stock has a strong and robust positive effect on 
profitability. Rogers et al. (2007) investigate a large set of UK small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and find a positive effect of domestic (UK) patents on profitability. For 
international (EPO) patents, the effect is negative for SMEs which have existed for less than 
10 years.  
To the best of our knowledge, no empirical studies have yet been conducted into the impact of 
trade secrets on firm profitability. There are also no empirical analyses concerning patenting 
and secrecy on process innovations success. In addition, no empirical work has yet considered 
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the interaction between patenting and secrecy when it comes to performance impacts of 
protection strategies. This paper aims to fill this gap to some extent. 
3. Model, Data and Descriptive Results 
Models  
In this paper, we estimate three types of empirical models, following Hall et al. (2013): (i) the 
determinants of using patenting and secrecy as methods to protect a firm’s innovations, (ii) 
the impact of patenting and secrecy effectiveness on a firm’s product and process innovation 
output, and (iii) the impact of patenting and secrecy effectiveness on firm profitability. We 
extend the analysis previously conducted by Hall et al. (2013), by considering a larger number 
of potential determinants, by looking at process innovation success, and by using firm 
profitability as a performance measure (rather than employment growth). Most importantly, 
we are able to run our analysis for a sub-sample of innovators with only a single innovation. 
This allows us to establish the determinants and the impacts of combining patent and secrecy 
strategies. 
The first model relates a firm’s i decision to use patents or trade secrets as a protection 
methods (pm) to a set of variables that are intended to represent the six hypotheses discussed 
above (strength of IP law - ip_str, degree of innovation competition - in_com, level of 
innovation - in_lev, type of innovation - in_typ, open innovation practices - in_op and 
financial constraints - fi_con): 
pmi =  + 1 ip_stri + 2 in_comi + 3 in_levi + 4 in_typi + 5 in_opi + 
 6 fi_coni +  Xi + i [1] 
where pm represents the use and effectiveness of patents and trade secrets. pm is 
operationalised in different ways. The main model variant employs the four combinations of 
using patents and trade secrets (none of them, both of them, only patenting, only secrecy). 
Other model variants employ binary measures (use of patents, use of trade secrets, high 
importance of patents, high importance of secrets, importance of patents dominate over trade 
secrets, importance of trade secrets dominate over patents) or the firms’ assessment of the 
effectiveness of the two protection methods (measured at a 4-point Likert scale). In another 
model variant, the structure of Arundel (2001) and Hall et al. (2013) is followed by using a 
measure of the relative importance of trade secrets over patents. This measure gives the 
difference between the effectiveness rating of trade secrets and the effectiveness rating of 
patents and can hence range from +3 (trade secrets are highly effective, but patents are not 
effective at all) to -3.  The vector X includes the size and age of a firm as well as the industry 
in which a firm operates.  
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The second model relates the level of innovation output (in_out) a firm i obtained in period z 
to the chosen protection method in period t: 
in_outiz =  +  pmit +  Xit + iz [2] 
where in_out covers measures of product innovation (sales with new products) and process 
innovation success (cost reduction). Control variables (vector X) include size, age and the 
level of innovation input.  
The third model relates a firm’s financial performance (profit margin) in period z to the 
chosen protection method in period t while controlling for the effect of innovation output and 
other firm characteristics as well as a firm’s stock of trade marks (tm) since : 
perfz =  + 1 pmit + 2 tmit + 1 in_outit + 2 Xit + iz [3] 
In line with Hall et al. (2013), all models are restricted to innovating firms. These are firms 
which have introduced a product or a process innovation in the last three years. This 
restriction ensures that only firms that have had to decide whether and how to protect recently 
introduced innovations are included in the analysis. 
Data 
Our empirical analysis is based on data from the German innovation survey. This survey is 
part of the Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) of the European Commission. In contrast to 
most national contributions to the CIS, the German survey is based on a panel sample and 
conducted annually. The survey is conducted by the Centre for European Economic Research 
located in Mannheim, and is hence also called the “Mannheim Innovation Panel” (MIP) (see 
Peters and Rammer, 2013, for more information on the panel nature of the survey). The MIP 
data have been matched with patent application data (from the European Patent Office and the 
German Patent and Trade Mark Office) and with trade mark application data (at the Office for 
Harmonization in the Internal Market and at the German Patent and Trade Mark Office). This 
allows us to complement the survey data with firm-specific patent indicators and to control 
for the use of trade marks as an alternative protection method. 
For this paper, we use two recent survey waves that contained information on the use and 
importance of different methods to protect a firm’s innovations (see the Appendix for the 
exact wording and layout of the questions). Both the 2010 and 2012 surveys asked firms to 
rate the importance of eight methods used to protect a firm’s IP and innovations (see the 
Annex for the exact wording of the questions). The eight methods include patents, utility 
patents, industrial designs, trade marks, copyrights, lead time advantages, complexity of 
goods or services, and secrecy. For each method firms were required to state whether they had 
used this method within the previous three-year period (2008 to 2010, and 2010 to 2012, 
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respectively), and how important a role it played in their protecting efforts. In 2010, 
importance was rated in terms of the role methods played in protecting the firm’s IP, while in 
2012, the question was phrased differently, asking firms to rate the effectiveness of each 
method in terms of maintaining or increasing the competitiveness of product and process 
innovations. In both surveys, importance was measured on a three-point Likert scale (high, 
medium, low). We use this information to build five types of dependent variables for model 
[1]: (i) categorical variables measuring the importance of patenting and secrecy, respectively, 
as a method for protecting a firm’s innovations on a 4-point Likert scale (no, low, medium, 
high importance); (ii) dummy variables indicating the use of patenting and secrecy, 
respectively; (iii) dummy variables for patenting and secrecy, respectively, having a high 
importance for protecting innovations; (iv) dummy variables for using neither patenting nor 
secrecy, for using both, and for using only one of the two methods; (v) dummy variables for 
firms that either rate both patenting and secrecy of medium or high importance or only one of 
the two; (vi) an indicator measuring the difference in importance between patenting and 
secrecy, following Arundel (2001) and Hall et al. (2013). 
A main drawback of existing firm-level analysis of patenting and secrecy is that many firms 
advance several innovations at the same time. If one only knows whether a firm has used 
patenting or secrecy for any innovation in a certain period of time, as is the case with CIS-
type data, it is impossible to determine which innovation was protected by which method. 
One solution is to collect information on protection methods for only a single innovation, e.g. 
the firm’s most important innovation (see Arora et al., 2016). A drawback of this approach is 
that there might be spillovers from other innovations in the same firm on the choice of 
protection methods and their effectiveness for the single innovation one is looking at. Another 
option is to focus on firms with only one innovation. This is they was we follow in this paper. 
Fortunately, the MIP data collects information on the number of different innovation projects 
a firm has conducted with the three-year reference period, distinguishing between 
successfully completed, ongoing and discontinued projects.1 This allows us to identify single 
innovation firms, i.e. firms that have completed only one innovation project during the three-
year period considered, and which have neither ongoing, nor discontinued projects. It would 
seem that 24% of all innovating firms in our sample are single innovation firms. 39% of these 
single innovation firms combine patenting and secrecy.  
By focussing our analysis on single innovators we can be sure that the protection methods 
used refer to one and the same innovation. This choice of course limits the conclusions we can 
draw from this study as our findings apply only to this specific group of innovators. This 
limitation does not seem to be particularly severe, however, as single innovators do not differ 
                                                 
1 This question as well as a series of other questions we use in this paper go beyond the harmonised CIS questionnaire and 
are not included in the questionnaires of other countries that participate in the CIS data collection effort. 
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substantially from the average innovator. Descriptive statistics (see Table 7 in the Appendix) 
show that on average, single innovators are younger, there is not, however, a significant 
difference in size since, with many large firms also included in this group. The market 
environment in which single innovators operate seems to be rather similar to that of multiple 
innovators. There are also no significant differences with respect to capital intensity, 
innovation intensity and financial performance (profit margin). A main difference is that 
single innovators report a lower level of innovation performance both in terms of continuous 
in-house R&D activity and innovation success (introduction of new-to-market innovations, 
sales share of new-to-firm innovations, cost reduction from process innovation). In addition, 
they are less frequently process innovators and are less often engaged in cooperation with 
other businesses.  
In order to compare the results obtained for single innovators with the entire group of 
innovating firms, we also run our models for the entire sample of innovators and report the 
results for both samples. 
Variables 
In order to test the six hypotheses discussed in section 2, we use the following variables in the 
protection method decision model [1]: 
- Strength of IP law (H1): In general, patent and trade secrets law is uniform for all firms in 
Germany. The effectiveness of patent law protection may vary by field of technology and 
sector, however, depending on the legal possibility of patenting new knowledge, and on court 
practice in dealing with patent litigation. Following Hussinger (2006), we calculate the 
proportion of innovating firms using patents as an indicator for the strength of patent law.2 
This proportion is calculated by dividing the number of firms with valid patents (granted 
patents that are still active) by the number of innovating firms, using the 3-digit sector level. 
The number of firms in Germany with valid patents is taken from the Patstat database which 
has been linked with company data (provided by Creditreform, the German source of the 
Bureau van Dijk databases) to establish the sector code of patent applicants. The number of 
innovating firms is calculated on the basis of the innovation survey data using weighted 
results. In addition, we calculate the share of valid patents in a sector that has been licensed 
out to third parties, using information on the number of out-licensed patents collected in the 
2010 wave of the MIP. As there is no evidence to suggest that trade secret law, part of 
common law in Germany, varies systematically by sectors or technology, we do not use an 
indicator for the strength of trade secret law.  
                                                 
2 We do not follow Hussinger (2006) exactly as she calculated the share of firms using patents and secrecy from the sample 
she used for model estimations. We believe that this procedure suffers from technical endogeneity since the dependent 
variable is used to construct an independent model variable. 
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- Degree of innovation competition (H2): We use a variable that captures the degree of 
technological uncertainty, assuming that a market with high technological uncertainty is 
characterised by a large number of firms competing for innovation. If a firm is the dominating 
innovator in its market, technological uncertainty shall be low for this firm. The degree of 
technological uncertainty has been measured directly in both waves of the MIP. In order to 
control for the general intensity of competition, we use the number of competitors in the 
firm’s main product market and separate firms with a high number of competitors (16 or 
more) from those with few competitors (5 or less). In addition, we add a dummy variable 
indicating whether the number of competitors has recently increased. 
- Level of innovation (H3): Following Hall et al. (2013), we distinguish new-to-the-market 
innovations from innovations only new to the firm. In addition, we use information on the 
extent of a firm’s innovation activities (innovation expenditure per employee) to control for 
the amount of new knowledge generating by the firm’s innovative activities.  
- Type of innovation (H4): As suggested by the theoretical literature, we distinguish product 
and process innovation. Since service innovations are virtually excluded from patent 
protection under German and European patent law, we also differentiate between product 
innovation for manufactured goods and product innovation for services.  
- Open innovation practice (H5): We use a dummy variable that indicates whether a firm 
engages in innovation cooperation with external partners, distinguishing between cooperation 
with business partners on the one hand (clients, suppliers, competitors), and partners from 
universities and private or public research organisations on the other.  
- Financial constraints (H6): We measure both internal and external financial constraints. For 
likely internal financial constraints we use a firm’s lagged profitability. External financial 
constraints are measured by the credit rating a firm was given by Germany’s largest credit 
rating agency (Creditreform).  
For the innovation performance model [2] we use three dependent variables: sales from new-
to-the-market innovations, sales from innovations that were only new to the firm 
(‘imitations’), and the degree of cost reduction resulting from process innovations. While the 
first two variables are well established in innovation research (see Mairesse and Mohnen, 
2010) and were also used by Hussinger (2006) and Hall et al. (2013), our indicator of process 
innovation performance has as yet rarely been used (Piening and Salge, 2015, being one of the 
few examples), despite the fact that the MIP has included this variable since 1994. The 
independent variables of the innovation performance model include, in addition to patenting 
and secrecy, innovation input, size and age. Innovation input is measured by innovation 
intensity (innovation expenditure per employee) and continuous R&D activity as a measure of 
the degree of novelty of the generated knowledge (see Laursen and Salter, 2006; Leiponen 
and Helfat, 2010; Klingebiel and Rammer, 2014). Since performance impacts of protection 
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strategies may be lagged, we test the model with different lags between the reference period 
of the protection strategy and the year for which innovation success is measured. 
The firm performance model [3] investigates the impact of the chosen protection strategy on 
firm profitability. We employ a profitability model that has been previously used by other 
authors using the MIP data (Rexhäuser and Rammer, 2014; Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2010). The 
dependent variable is the profit margin, i.e. pre-tax profits as a share of sales. Firms reported 
return on sales within nine ordered categories with known thresholds. Control variables 
include fixed capital intensity (assets per employee), the type of innovation introduced (new-
to-the-market product innovation, new-to-the-firm product innovation, cost-reducing process 
innovation) as well as an index on the degree of competition, following Rexhäuser and 
Rammer (2014). Given that branding may add an additional layer of product differentiation 
and may increase the customer’s willingness to pay through positive reputation effects (see 
Crass, 2014), we also include a dummy for branding activities (i.e. positive number of valid 
trade marks). As is the case with innovation performance, we also consider a potential lag 
between the time at which a protection strategy was chosen, and the year for which 
profitability is measured. 
All models include size, firm age and sector as well as a dummy variable for the year of 
observation as further controls. Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent model 
variables are depicted in Table 8 to Table 10 in the Appendix. 
Descriptive Results 
The share of innovating firms using patents to protect their IP and their innovations is 
significantly smaller than the share of firms using trade secrets. In the 2012 survey, 74.1% of 
all innovating firms, that is to say all firms having introduced product or process innovations, 
used trade secrets, while only 47.8% used patents.3 For single innovators, these percentages 
are smaller with respect to the use of trade secrets (62.5%), and at a similar level for patents 
(45.0%).  
Table 1: Use of patents and trade secrets in innovating firms in Germany 2010 and 2012 
 Patents Trade Secrets 
 2010a) 2012b) 2010a) 2012b) 
a) innovating firms with a single innovation     
Use 38.4 45.0 60.6 62.5 
Therein: high importance / effectiveness 12.6 15.5 39.5 17.7 
Therein: medium importance / effectiveness 10.5 16.4 15.3 23.4 
Therein: low importance / effectiveness 15.4 13.2 5.7 21.3 
                                                 
3 All descriptive results are based on weighted data. The German Innovation Survey is a sample survey based on a stratified 
random sample with 896 strata (56 NACE 2-digit sectors, 8 size classes, 2 regions). Weights are calculated using population 
figures from the official German Business Register. Weights have been adjusted for a potential non-response bias between 
innovating and non-innovating firms. See Aschhoff et al. (2013) for details on the weighting method. 
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Not used 61.6 55.0 39.4 37.5 
b) all innovating firms     
Use 36.8 47.8 57.3 74.1 
Therein: high importance / effectiveness 11.9 18.8 34.5 24.8 
Therein: medium importance / effectiveness 9.3 16.6 14.7 25.7 
Therein: low importance / effectiveness 15.6 12.5 8.2 23.6 
Not used 63.2 52.2 42.7 25.9 
a) Used for protecting the intellectual property of a firm. - b) Used for maintaining or increasing the competitiveness of 
product and process innovations. 
Source: German Innovation Survey (CIS 2010, CIS 2012), CIS core sectors only, weighted results. 
The difference is less marked when looking at firms which report both patenting and secrecy 
to be being highly effective: 24.8% of all innovating firms (17.7% of single innovators) 
perceive secrecy as being highly effective for maintaining or increasing the competitiveness 
of their innovations, whereas 18.8% (single innovators: 15.5%) report this to be the case for 
patents.  
The results for the 2010 survey differ from those from 2012 insofar as the proportion of 
innovating firms using secrecy or patenting is lower (57.3% for trade secrets, 36.8% for 
patents), whilst a larger share of firms rate secrecy as highly effective (34.5%). Interestingly, 
the differences between the two surveys are lower for single innovators. The main reason for 
the different results in regards to secrecy is to be found in the different wording of the 
question. While the 2012 survey directly relates to the effectiveness of the innovations’ 
competitiveness, the 2010 survey refers to a firm’s intellectual property in general. The results 
suggest that trade secrets are more effective in protecting a firm’s general IP (which may also 
include IP not related to product or process innovation) than in protecting the competitiveness 
of innovations in the market. 
Table 2: Use of patents and trade secrets in innovating firms in Germany 2012, by size class 
(no. of employees) 
 Patents Trade Secrets 
 10-49 50-249 250+ 10-49 50-249 250+ 
a) innovating firms with a single innovation       
Used 42.3 50.9 81.6 61.3 64.5 86.5 
Therein: high effectiveness 13.6 19.1 44.3 18.5 15.8 9.9 
Therein: medium effectiveness 15.1 18.7 36.0 22.7 21.7 68.0 
Therein: low effectiveness 13.5 13.1 1.3 20.0 26.9 8.5 
Not used 57.7 49.1 18.4 38.7 35.5 13.5 
b) all innovating firms       
Used 40.9 58.6 72.8 71.2 79.1 82.4 
Therein: high effectiveness 14.6 22.8 41.2 24.9 23.4 28.2 
Therein: medium effectiveness 13.1 23.8 23.1 23.2 29.6 34.3 
Therein: low effectiveness 13.1 12.0 8.4 23.1 26.1 20.0 
Not used 59.1 41.4 27.2 28.8 20.9 17.6 
Source: German Innovation Survey (CIS 2012), CIS core sectors only, weighted results. 
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Our results confirm the findings of earlier empirical studies on the use of patents and secrecy 
which have frequently found that a higher proportion of innovating firms rely on secrecy than 
patenting (see Levin et al., 1987; Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999; Cohen et al., 2000, 2002; 
Arundel, 2001; Hanel, 2008). When differentiating by size class, the findings become more 
diverse. Large firms still use trade secrets more frequently than patents, but they rate the 
effectiveness of patenting as higher than for secrecy. This is particularly true for single 
innovators. Among medium-sized firms, a similar share of all innovators rate patents and 
trade secrets as being highly effective. Among firms with a single innovation, more find 
patenting highly effective than secrecy. Small firms more often report secrecy as being highly 
effective than they do patenting. This holds for all innovators and for single innovators. 
Table 3: Combination of patents and trade secrets in innovating firms in Germany 2012 
  Trade Secrets 







a) innovating firms with a single innovation 
Patents Used, high effectiveness 5.5 4.8 2.7 2.5 
 Used, medium effectiveness 2.8 5.8 5.6 2.2 
 Used, low effectiveness 2.6 2.2 6.8 1.7 
 Not used 6.9 10.6 6.3 31.2 
b) all innovating firms 
Patents Used, high effectiveness 7.9 5.6 3.6 1.7 
 Used, medium effectiveness 3.7 6.7 4.2 2.0 
 Used, low effectiveness 3.1 3.1 4.9 1.3 
 Not used 10.1 10.3 10.9 20.9 
Source: German Innovation Survey (CIS 2012), CIS core sectors only, weighted results. 
Firms regularly combine patenting and secrecy to protect their innovations. In 2012, only 
20.9% of all innovating firms in Germany used neither patenting nor secrecy, while 42.8% 
used both. Firms that neither use patenting nor secrecy either use other protection methods 
(e.g. trade marks, copyrights, industrial designs, lead time advantage) or refrain from any 
protection, particularly if their innovations are imitations of other firms’ original innovations. 
Most firms that seek patent protection also use trade secrets; only 10% of patent users did not 
rely on secrecy in 2012. Among all firms employing secrecy as a protection method, 58% also 
used patents, while 42% did not. The results do not substantially change when looking at 
innovating firms with a single innovation. 38.8% of these single innovators used both patents 
and trade secrets. 5.5% stated that both were highly effective, with 18.9% giving both 
methods the rating of at least medium effectiveness. 
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4. Estimation Results 
Protection Method Decision 
We analyse a firm’s choice to use secrecy or patenting to protect its innovation and IP, and 
the perceived effectiveness of the two instruments through different measures, as described 
above. Table 4 reports the results for the four combinations of using secrecy and patenting. In 
particular, this model variant allows the relevance of the six hypotheses on a firm’s choice to 
use both protection methods simultaneously, or to rely only on one of the two, to be 
investigated. For comparison, Table 11 (in the Appendix) shows the model results when 
looking separately at a firm’s decision to use trade secrets or patents (by allowing error terms 
to be correlated), and Table 12 presents the respective estimation results for firms evaluating 
the effectiveness of trade secrets and patents as high. The results of ordered probit regressions 
on the firm’s Likert scale evaluation of the effectiveness of secrecy and patenting are shown 
in Table 13. Further model variants look at the relative importance of secrecy over patenting 
by taking the difference between the secrecy and patenting ratings, as done in Hall et al. 
(2013) (see Table 14), and by separating firms that rate the effectiveness of both secrecy and 
patenting as being high of medium from those that rate only one of the two methods as such 
(Table 15). 
All models are estimated for single innovators and all innovators. Comparing the results gives 
some indication of the robustness of findings for firms with multiple innovations (which is the 
standard case in most of the existing empirical literature) when it comes to the determinants 
and effects of using both secrecy and patenting as protection methods.  
The estimation results of the various model variants reveal a number of common findings. H1 
on the strength of IP law is confirmed as firms operating in sectors with a high share of 
innovators with patents are more likely to prefer patenting and are less likely to rely on 
secrecy. The results hold for both single innovators and for all innovators. We do not find a 
robust result for the impact of the degree of licensing on the choice of the protection method. 
In some model variants, we find a positive impact of the degree of licensing of patents on the 
effectiveness of secrecy, which holds only for all innovators, but not for single innovators. 
A high degree of competition, measured in terms of the number of competitors in a firm’s 
main market, acts rather as an incentive to use neither secrecy nor patenting, as suggested by 
the model provided by Gill (2008). This finding holds for single innovators who rate the 
effectiveness of both protection methods as being significantly lower if they operate in 
markets with many competitors (see Table 12 and Table 13). High technological uncertainty 
is a driver for combining secrecy and patenting both in firms with a single innovation, and in 
the entire group of innovators. This is in line with the findings illustrated in Ponce’s (2007) 
model on preventing competitors from developing the same innovation.  
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Single innovators with new-to-market innovations favour patenting over secrecy. We find a 
positive and significant coefficient both for using both patenting and secrecy, and for using 
only patenting. Single innovators that heavily invest in innovation prefer to combine both 
protection methods and are much less likely to refrain from using either of the two. This result 
supports H3 and is in line with the literature which stresses that patenting is more commonly 
used for large innovations (Moser, 2011). While we find a negative impact of both new-to-
market innovations and innovation intensity on using only secrecy for all innovators, this 
effect becomes insignificant when looking at single innovators, suggesting that the negative 
effect is the result from different protection strategies for different innovations. The 
alternative variable specifications of combining secrecy and patenting support these results 




Table 4: Determinants of using secrecy and/or patenting to protect a firm’s innovations / IP: results of probit models (estimated coefficients, 
significance levels in brackets) 
  Firms with a single innovation All innovators 




















-0.554* 0.506 -0.716*** 1.005*** -1.134*** 0.505** -0.643*** 1.240*** Share of innovators 
with patents (0.065) (0.231) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) 
-0.009 -0.047 0.012 0.008 -0.005 -0.046 0.009 0.017 
Strength of IP 
Law 
Share of out-licensed 
patents (0.747) (0.341) (0.644) (0.772) (0.756) (0.148) (0.564) (0.244) 
-0.370*** -0.238 0.061 0.279*** -0.133*** -0.086 -0.006 0.122*** High technological 
uncertainty (D)a) (0.000) (0.102) (0.482) (0.001) (0.003) (0.179) (0.879) (0.002) 
0.219** -0.142 -0.013 -0.156 0.009 -0.216** 0.026 0.017 Large no. of 
competitors (D)a) (0.049) (0.481) (0.904) (0.151) (0.867) (0.017) (0.604) (0.740) 
0.115 0.094 -0.118 -0.050 -0.004 -0.080 -0.087** 0.076* Small number of 
competitors (D)a) (0.255) (0.516) (0.211) (0.591) (0.935) (0.222) (0.049) (0.077) 





increased (D)a) (0.951) (0.234) (0.544) (0.323) (0.095) (0.840) (0.743) (0.426) 
-0.542*** 0.411*** -0.100 0.378*** -0.527*** 0.234*** -0.082* 0.369*** Market novelty (D)a) 
(0.000) (0.004) (0.293) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.059) (0.000) 
-0.152*** 0.017 0.001 0.105*** -0.095*** -0.060** -0.030** 0.102*** Innovation intensity 
(log)a) (0.000) (0.710) (0.968) (0.001) (0.000) (0.010) (0.045) (0.000) 




expenditure (D) (0.000) (0.127) (0.491) (0.001) (0.000) (0.428) (0.370) (0.000) 
0.101 -0.098 0.039 -0.113 0.018 -0.143** 0.025 -0.005 Type of 
innovation  
Process innovator (D) 
(0.238) (0.458) (0.625) (0.160) (0.672) (0.021) (0.522) (0.904) 
0.014 0.028 -0.086 0.114 -0.122* -0.002 0.073 0.012 Cooperation with 
businesses (D)a) (0.915) (0.873) (0.441) (0.283) (0.064) (0.979) (0.176) (0.809) 
-0.265** -0.092 -0.159 0.334*** -0.336*** -0.066 -0.224*** 0.388*** 
Open 
innovation 
practice Cooperation with 
research (D)a) (0.025) (0.561) (0.128) (0.001) (0.000) (0.408) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 4: Ctd. 
  Firms with a single innovation All innovators 




















0.051 0.002 -0.023 -0.031 0.040 -0.032 -0.007 -0.022 Credit rating (lagged) 
(0.324) (0.985) (0.656) (0.567) (0.158) (0.438) (0.803) (0.402) 
-0.006 -0.133 -0.036 0.058 -0.039 -0.100 -0.013 0.041 High profit margin 
(lagged)a) (0.951) (0.432) (0.710) (0.557) (0.459) (0.201) (0.791) (0.382) 
-0.016 -0.014 -0.058 0.066 -0.078 0.087 0.025 -0.005 
Financial 
constraints 
Low profit margin 
(lagged)a) (0.902) (0.946) (0.643) (0.592) (0.228) (0.330) (0.675) (0.931) 
0.153*** 0.008 -0.006 -0.136*** 0.076*** 0.042 -0.023 -0.062*** Age (log # years) 
(0.001) (0.915) (0.894) (0.002) (0.000) (0.175) (0.228) (0.001) 
-0.101*** 0.023 -0.086** 0.150*** -0.113*** 0.019 -0.095*** 0.151*** 
Controls 
Size (log # 
employees) (0.004) (0.649) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.351) (0.000) (0.000) 
Applies to 366 57 339 484 1,543 271 1,408 2,635 
No. of observations 1,246 1,246 1,246 1,246 5,857 5,857 5,857 5,857 
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level. D: dummy variable. 
a) Missing values for these variables have been set to 0 and indicators were added to indicate this data change. 
All models include 15 sector dummies and an indicator for the survey wave used. 
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Single innovators with a process innovation do not show a clear preference for secrecy or 
patenting. The estimation results for the relative importance of the two protection strategies 
suggest that process innovators give secrecy a higher rating than patenting (Table 14). But 
when looking at which of the two strategies dominate, no significant impact is found (Table 
15). Investigating the effect of process innovations on the efficiency rating of the two methods 
separately, we find a significant negative impact on patenting but no impact on secrecy (see 
Table 11 to Table 13). This is in some contrast to the findings for all innovators which also 
show a weakly significant positive effect on secrecy. We cannot therefore support the view 
commonly expressed in the literature that process innovators opt for secrecy over patenting 
(H4). 
Single innovators that collaborate with other businesses do not favour a certain protection 
strategy. The situation is very different for firms co-operating with universities and other 
research institutions. Whilst they are more likely to combine secrecy and patenting, however, 
they do not rate one method as being more effective than the other. Our results suggest that 
firms tend to follow organisational openness in collaboration with business partners but try to 
prevent knowledge outflows when collaborating with other research bodies, by both enforcing 
confidentiality agreements and patenting critical technological knowledge that has been 
developed during cooperation. The results for all innovators are largely in line with those for 
single innovators, though we find that it is the case for all innovators that if they cooperate 
with research institutions, they are less likely to rely only on secrecy. This result does not hold 
for single innovators. 
Our last hypotheses on the role of financial constraints cannot be confirmed with our data. We 
do not find a higher propensity to rely on secrecy rather than patenting for firms with lower 
financial resources. Most indicators of a firm’s internal and external financial situation are 
insignificant in the majority of model variants. There is some indication that single innovators 
with a high level of profitability rate secrecy as being more effective than patenting, which is 
in contrast to the theoretical expectation. 
With respect to the control variables for age and size we find that younger firms as well as 
larger firms are more likely to rely on a combined strategy of secrecy and patenting. While the 
result for larger firms is to be expected, as a combined strategy is more demanding and tends 
to require more resources, the higher propensity of young firms may indicate that their 
innovations are more vulnerable to being copied or imitated by others as they lack 
complementary assets that can be used to protect their innovations such as reputation or brand 
value.  
Innovation Output 
The results of the innovation output models suggest that combining patenting and secrecy as 
protection methods yields higher returns with new-to-market innovations. For single 
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innovators, the immediate effect of relying only on patenting is higher, but in the following 
year firms are more likely to achieve more innovative sales if they have used a combined 
protection strategy (see Table 16). This result is supported by Table 17 which shows a weakly 
significant negative effect of the relative importance of secrecy over patenting for the 
immediate new product success, but not significant effect if innovative sales in the following 
year are evaluated.  
We do not find a significant impact of the chosen protection method on innovation success 
with product imitations, suggesting that this type of innovation is difficult to effectively 
protect by using these two methods. For cost savings from process innovation, there is a 
slightly positive impact of single innovators that rely more on secrecy than on patenting.  
When comparing the results for single innovators with those for all innovators, it becomes 
evident that the strong effect of combining secrecy and patenting on the innovation success of 
product imitations and process innovations, which can be seen for all innovators, is not seen 
in the case of firms with a single innovation. The positive effects of a combined strategy 
found for all innovators may rather reflect positive output effects of a diversified innovation 
strategy which combines new-to-market innovations with product imitations and process 
innovation. Such positive output effects of diversified innovators may rest on synergies in 
marketing or shared development costs. The ‘combined protection strategy’ may be an 
artefact at the firm level if each type of innovation is protected by a specific single method. 
Another remarkable difference is the higher innovation output of firms that only use secrecy 
to protect their innovations (compared to firms that neither use secrecy nor patenting). This 
positive effect is only present for all innovators, but not for single innovators. This may also 
suggest that secrecy is used to protect other innovations and is not a determining factor for the 
innovation success in terms of product imitation sales and cost reduction. One should keep in 
mind, however, that innovation success of firms with a single innovation may not be fully 
comparable to innovation success of firms with multiple innovations if the former lack certain 




Table 5: Effects of using secrecy and patenting on innovation success: results of OLS models (estimated coefficients, significance levels in 
brackets) 





Cost reductions owing 





Cost reductions owing 
to process innovations 
 No lag No lag 1 year lag No lag 1 year lag no lag 1 year lag 1 year lag No lag 1 year lag No lag 1 year lag 
0.380* 0.478 0.410 0.336 -0.012 0.282 0.605*** 0.352* 0.411*** 0.830*** 0.224* 0.926*** Secrecy only 
(D) (0.087) (0.200) (0.159) (0.506) (0.960) (0.539) (0.000) (0.089) (0.006) (0.001) (0.081) (0.000) 
2.034*** 1.196 -0.382 0.033 -0.536 0.169 1.591*** 1.367*** 0.388 0.530 -0.216 0.475 Patenting only 
(D) (0.000) (0.171) (0.495) (0.972) (0.176) (0.814) (0.000) (0.001) (0.160) (0.243) (0.376) (0.355) 
1.131*** 1.311*** 0.252 0.116 -0.186 0.452 1.398*** 0.910*** 0.418*** 0.741*** 0.248* 0.993*** Both secrecy and 
patenting (D) (0.000) (0.001) (0.400) (0.819) (0.414) (0.243) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.003) (0.052) (0.000) 
0.115 0.143 0.357*** 0.817*** 0.452*** 0.510*** 0.470*** 0.554*** 0.750*** 0.975*** 0.695*** 0.854*** Size (log # 
employees) (0.163) (0.289) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.131 0.222 0.039 0.037 0.002 0.039 0.005 -0.124 0.081 0.250*** -0.098* -0.015 Age (log # 
years) (0.173) (0.211) (0.759) (0.865) (0.981) (0.843) (0.923) (0.203) (0.165) (0.007) (0.065) (0.890) 
0.236*** 0.264** 0.220** 0.307** 0.125* 0.307** 0.322*** 0.293*** 0.265*** 0.307*** 0.205*** 0.376*** Innovation 
intensity (log)a) (0.001) (0.016) (0.014) (0.046) (0.069) (0.032) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
-1.731*** -1.817** -1.385** -3.791*** -0.765 -2.707*** -2.129*** -2.357*** -1.132*** -2.926*** -1.696*** -2.632*** No innovation 
expenditure (D) (0.000) (0.019) (0.046) (0.000) (0.134) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1.003*** 1.599*** -0.358 1.317*** 0.530*** 0.568 1.163*** 1.136*** 0.469*** 1.419*** 0.275** 0.771*** Continuous 
R&D (D)a) (0.000) (0.000) (0.159) (0.006) (0.008) (0.207) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.002) 
No. of 
observations 1,033 363 1,033 360 1,033 257 4,662 1,676 4,662 1,648 4,662 1,229 
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level. D: dummy variable. 
a) Missing values for these variables have been set to 0 and indicators were added to indicate this data change. 




The protection strategy chosen by an innovating firm has rather little short-term impacts on 
the firm’s profitability. We find a weakly significant positive impact for single innovators that 
report that only secrecy, and not patenting, is highly effective in protecting their 
innovations/IP (Table 6). This effect is of a similar magnitude for all innovators (about 1 
percentage point higher profit margin), but shows a higher significance level, which may be 
due to the larger number of observations. If we look at the profitability in the same year that 
an innovation has been introduced, we also find a positive effect for all innovators reporting 
that only patenting is effective. Firms that rate both secrecy and patenting as being highly 
effective do not yield higher profit margins. Indeed, the interaction seen where both secrecy 
and patenting are rated as highly effective is in fact negative for all innovators. This suggests 
that combing both protection methods is associated with higher costs but no additional level 
of protection. 
Table 6: Impact of effectiveness of secrecy and patenting on firm profitability: results of 
interval regression models (estimated coefficients, significance levels in brackets) 
 Firms with a single innovation All innovators 
 No lag 1 year lag No lag 1 year lag 
0.950 1.513* 0.935*** 0.884** Highly effective: secrecy only (D) 
(0.111) (0.068) (0.001) (0.020) 
-0.919 -1.455 0.686* -0.460 Highly effective: patenting only (D) 
(0.275) (0.187) (0.068) (0.395) 
0.638 -0.049 0.494 0.772 Highly effective: both secrecy and 
patenting (D) (0.415) (0.963) (0.152) (0.108) 
1.126 1.935** 0.472* 0.993** Valid trade marks (D) 
(0.106) (0.045) (0.093) (0.011) 
-0.484*** -0.310 -0.154** -0.431*** Size (log # employees) 
(0.008) (0.204) (0.037) (0.000) 
0.152 0.400 0.206* 0.429*** Age (log # years) 
(0.541) (0.239) (0.059) (0.008) 
0.156 -0.061 -0.066 0.626 Market novelty (D) 
(0.812) (0.943) (0.826) (0.144) 
-0.032 0.348 -0.142 0.347 Product imitation (D) 
(0.958) (0.667) (0.622) (0.395) 
0.942* 1.469** 0.527** 1.065*** Process innovation (D) 
(0.058) (0.030) (0.020) (0.001) 
-0.040 0.375* 0.098* 0.209** Capital intensity  
(€ per employee, log)a) (0.739) (0.058) (0.071) (0.020) 
-0.138 -0.508*** -0.306*** -0.406*** Intense competition (index) 
(0.154) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. of observations 974 531 4,399 2,145 
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level. D: dummy variable. 
a) Missing values for these variables have been set to 0 and indicators were added to indicate this data change. 
All models include 15 sector dummies and an indicator for the survey wave used. 
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When evaluating the use of secrecy and patenting (rather than effectiveness, as in Table 6), 
we do not find any significant impact on profitability, neither for single innovators nor for all 
innovators. When examining the relative importance of secrecy over patenting, secrecy seems 
more likely to enable a firm to achieve a high profit margin. Both for single innovators and 
for all innovators, the difference in the importance rating of secrecy and patenting is positive 
and statistically significant when looking at the profit level in the year following the 
introduction of an innovation (Table 19). This would imply that the technological monopoly 
granted by a patent is not strong enough to overcome the knowledge outflow resulting from 
disclosing key technological features of the inventions underlying an innovation during 
patenting. This result is in some contrast to papers that found a positive impact of patenting 
on the financial performance of firms (Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2010). One explanation for this 
difference is the different sample structure. Whilst we look only at a rather homogenous 
sample of firms that consists only of businesses that were recently able to introduce an 
innovation, Czarnitzki and Kraft (2010) investigate a sample of all types of firms, both 
innovators and non-innovators. In addition, we control for trade marks which do have a 
significant positive impact on profitability.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigated the determinants and outcomes of firms’ decisions to protect their 
innovations though trade secrets and patents. We looked particularly at the role played by a 
combined protection strategy, i.e. using secrecy and patenting simultaneously as a protection 
strategy for a single innovation. In order to overcome the assignment problem common to 
firm-level innovation surveys, whereby one usually does not know whether firms employing 
both protection methods use them for one and the same innovation, or for different 
innovations, we have used unique information on the number of completed innovation 
projects gained from the German innovation survey. By focussing on firms with a single 
innovation we were able to establish the drivers for using both secrecy and patenting to 
protect an innovation, and the performance effect of this strategy with respect to innovation 
output and profitability, compared to that seen when only one, or none, of the two methods 
are implemented. The empirical analysis rests on two survey waves of the German innovation 
survey (reference years 2010 and 2012), with a total of 1,246 observations on firms with a 
single (product or process) innovation. 
We find that firms combine secrecy and patenting when the strength of patent protection in 
their sector is high, when technological uncertainty is high and when their innovation has a 
higher degree of novelty and requires significant financial investment. In addition, innovators 
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that co-operate with research bodies (universities and other research organisations) are more 
likely to rely on both secrecy and patenting. Young firms, as well as larger firms have a 
higher propensity to follow this protection strategy. Based on our data, financing constraints 
do not significantly affect the choice made between secrecy and patenting. 
The more frequent method of combining trade secrets and patents in order to protect the new-
to-market innovations of single innovators, translates into higher sales with this type of 
innovation when compared with other protection strategies. While single innovators with 
new-to-market innovations are also more likely to only use patents, but not secrecy as 
protection strategy, this strategy leads to higher sales only in the short run while a combined 
strategy seems to produce a longer lasting increase in innovation output. With respect to firm 
profitability, combining secrecy and patenting does not yield higher profit margins. We rather 
find a weakly significant positive effect for single innovators that rely only on secrecy.  
When comparing the determinants for the choice of either secrecy or patenting as a protection 
strategy we find rather few differences. Both secrecy and patenting tend to play a more 
important role as the level of innovation increases, where patent protection is stronger and if 
technological uncertainty is high. The main difference relates to process innovators who are 
more likely to rely on secrecy rather than patenting. While both protection methods trigger 
innovation output (compared to innovators using neither of the two instruments), secrecy is 
more effective with respect to obtaining higher cost reductions from process innovation, 
whilst patenting is more effective for new-to-market innovations. Firm profitability tends to 
be higher for innovators relying on secrecy, while patenting does not show a significant 
impact on the profitability of innovators.  
One main shortcoming of this research is the lack of panel data analysis. Whilst we had two 
survey waves containing information on protection strategies at hand, and were able to use 
one year lags for the impact of protection strategies on innovation output and firm 
profitability, no real panel data analysis could be performed. Although we were able to 
identify firms with a single innovation and hence overcome, to some extent, the notorious 
assignment problem of firm-level studies on the use of secrecy and patenting, the sample of 
single innovators may be a biased sample and may not be representative for the entire group 
of innovating firms. Panel data and information on innovation-specific protection strategies of 
multiple innovators would be extremely helpful to widen our understanding of the role of 
secrecy and patenting for increasing the returns to innovation.  
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Sig.1) All innovators 
Age (years) 27.6 33.2 ** 32.0 
Size (# employees) 487.2 607.2 - 581.7 
High technological uncertainty (%) 4.01 4.19 - 4.15 
Large number of competitors (%) 22.8 22.2 - 22.3 
Small number of competitors (%) 42.3 41.4 - 41.6 
New-to-market innovation (%) 29.9 36.8 ** 35.4 
Innovation intensity (1,000 € per employee) 17.8 19.6 - 19.1 
Process innovator (%) 52.1 63.8 ** 61.3 
Cooperation with businesses (%) 23.1 26.3 * 25.6 
Cooperation with research (%) 31.0 31.4 - 31.3 
Credit rating (index) 3.77 3.84 ** 3.83 
Sales share, new-to-market innovations (%) 5.49 5.64 - 5.61 
Sales share, new-to-firm innovations (%) 12.5 16.2 ** 15.4 
Share of cost reduction from process inn. (%) 2.00 2.72 ** 2.56 
Profit margin (categorial 1 to 9) 5.61 5.70 - 5.68 
Continuous R&D (%) 38.9 48.9 ** 46.8 
Capital intensity (1,000 € per employee) 118.4 166.2 - 155.7 
Distribution by sector   **  
Food 3.1 4.7  4.3 
Textiles 3.5 3.1  3.2 
Wood/Paper 3.3 3.0  3.1 
Chemicals 4.2 5.5  5.2 
Plastics 2.8 3.5  3.3 
Glass/Ceramics 2.0 2.4  2.3 
Metals 6.5 6.9  6.9 
Machinery 9.0 10.5  10.2 
Electronics 10.2 11.3  11.1 
Vehicles 2.2 3.8  3.5 
Consumer Products 3.3 3.8  3.7 
Utilities 6.7 4.9  5.2 
Trade/Transport 12.3 10.6  10.9 
IT Services 8.9 7.3  7.7 
Financial/Professional Services 22.1 18.6  19.4 
1) ** / *: difference between single and multiple innovators significant at the 1% / 5% level. 
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics for the protection method decision models 
 Firms with a single innovation All innovators 
 Mean St.dev. Min Max Mean St.dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables         
Neither secrecy nor patenting (D) 0.29 0.46 0 1 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Only patenting (D) 0.05 0.21 0 1 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Only secrecy (D) 0.27 0.45 0 1 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Both patenting and secrecy (D) 0.39 0.49 0 1 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Effectiveness of secrecy (Likert) 1.44 1.22 0 3 1.56 1.23 0 3 
Effectiveness of patenting (Likert) 0.92 1.18 0 3 1.07 1.22 0 3 
Use of secrecy (D) 0.66 0.47 0 1 0.69 0.46 0 1 
Use of patenting (D) 0.43 0.50 0 1 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Secrecy highly important (D) 0.28 0.45 0 1 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Patenting highly important (D) 0.18 0.38 0 1 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Relative importance of secrecy (index) 0.53 1.31 -3 3 0.49 1.32 -3 3 
Both secrecy and patenting important (D) 0.22 0.42 0 1 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Secrecy dominating (D) 0.35 0.48 0 1 0.32 0.46 0 1 
Patenting dominating (D) 0.09 0.29 0 1 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Independent variables         
Share of innovators with patents 0.35 0.18 0.0 1 0.37 0.20 0 1 
Share of out-licensed patents 0.64 1.66 0.00 12.56 0.52 1.39 0.00 12.56 
High technological uncertainty (D) 0.31 0.46 0 1 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Large number of competitors (D) 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Small number of competitors (D) 0.42 0.49 0 1 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Competition has increased (D) 0.24 0.43 0 1 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Market novelty (D) 0.30 0.46 0 1 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Innovation intensity (log) -4.22 2.39 -10.8 0.00 -3.62 2.47 -10.9 0.12 
No innovation expenditure (D) 0.07 0.25 0 1 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Process innovator (D) 0.52 0.50 0 1 0.61 0.49 0 1 
Cooperation with businesses (D) 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Cooperation with research (D) 0.31 0.46 0 1 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Credit rating (lagged) 3.77 0.77 0 6 3.83 0.70 0 6 
High profit margin (lagged) 0.27 0.45 0 1 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Low profit margin (lagged) 0.14 0.35 0 1 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Age (log # years) 2.87 0.96 -0.69 6.15 2.98 1.01 -0.69 6.23 
Size (log # employees) 3.33 1.37 0.92 12.86 3.91 1.71 0.00 12.86 
No. of observations 1,246 5,857 
D: dummy variable 
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Table 9: Descriptive statistics for the innovation output models [2] 
 Firms with a single innovation All innovators 
 Mean St.dev. Min Max Mean St.dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables         
New-to-market innovations (log) -4.99 3.02 -6.91 5.14 -4.27 3.69 -6.91 9.38 
Only new-to-firm innovations (log) -2.94 3.46 -6.91 8.37 -1.70 3.85 -6.91 10.48 
Cost reduction from process inn. (log) -5.59 2.71 -6.91 6.06 -4.79 3.47 -6.91 9.47 
Independent variables, secrecy/patenting        
Only patenting (D) 0.40 0.49 0 1 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Only secrecy (D) 0.27 0.44 0 1 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Both patenting and secrecy (D) 0.40 0.49 0 1 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Secrecy, low effectiveness (D) 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Secrecy, medium effectiveness (D) 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Secrecy, high effectiveness (D) 0.27 0.45 0 1 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Patenting, low effectiveness (D) 0.13 0.33 0 1 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Patenting, medium effectiveness (D) 0.13 0.34 0 1 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Patenting, high effectiveness (D) 0.18 0.39 0 1 0.21 0.40 0 1 
Relative importance of secrecy (index) 0.51 1.29 -3 3 0.49 1.32 -3 3 
Independent variables, others 3.29 1.33 0.92 9.07 3.81 1.62 0.92 11.61 
Size (log # employees) 2.86 0.97 -0.69 6.15 2.97 1.00 -0.69 6.23 
Age (log # years) -4.26 2.31 -10.81 0.00 -3.77 2.39 -10.93 0.00 
Innovation intensity (log) 0.06 0.23 0 1 0.08 0.27 0 1 
No innovation expenditure (D) 0.40 0.49 0 1 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Continuous R&D (D) -4.99 3.02 -6.91 5.14 -4.27 3.69 -6.91 9.38 
No. of observations 1,033 4,662 
D: dummy variable 
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Table 10: Descriptive statistics for the firm profitability models [3] 
 Firms with a single innovation All innovators 
 Mean St.dev. Min Max Mean St.dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables         
Profit margin (categorial) 4.84 5.21 -5 15 4.96 5.16 -5 15 
Independent variables, secrecy/patenting        
Only patenting highly effective (D) 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Only secrecy highly effective (D) 0.18 0.39 0 1 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Both patenting and secrecy highly 
effective (D) 
0.10 0.30 0 1 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Secrecy, high effectiveness (D) 0.28 0.45 0 1 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Patenting, low effectiveness (D) 0.18 0.38 0 1 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Only patenting used (D) 0.28 0.45 0 1 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Only secrecy used (D) 0.04 0.20 0 1 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Both patenting and secrecy used (D) 0.40 0.49 0 1 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Relative importance of secrecy (index) 0.55 1.30 -3 3 0.50 1.32 -3 3 
Independent variables, others         
Valid trade marks (D) 0.13 0.33 0 1 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Size (log # employees) 3.38 1.34 1.10 9.07 3.94 1.67 0.00 11.66 
Age (log # years) 2.90 0.93 -0.69 6.15 2.99 0.99 -0.69 6.23 
Market novelty (D) 0.30 0.46 0 1 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Product imitation (D) 0.42 0.49 0 1 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Process innovation (D) 0.52 0.50 0 1 0.62 0.48 0 1 
Capital intensity (€ per employee, log) -2.76 2.49 -15.91 1.46 -2.59 2.47 -18.26 1.88 
Competition intensity (index) 5.79 2.34 0 12 5.94 2.31 0 12 
No. of observations 974 4,399 




Table 11: Determinants of using secrecy and patenting for protecting a firm’s innovation / IP: 
results of bivariate probit models (estimated coefficients, significance levels in 
brackets) 
  Firms with a single innovation All innovators 








0.375 1.069*** 0.764*** 1.405*** Share of innovators 
with patents (0.180) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.019 0.000 0.023 0.005 
Strength of IP 
Law 
Share of out-licensed 
patents (0.511) (0.998) (0.141) (0.734) 
0.388*** 0.218** 0.138*** 0.098** High technological 
uncertainty (D)a) (0.000) (0.011) (0.001) (0.013) 
-0.167 -0.189* 0.053 -0.042 Large no. of 
competitors (D)a) (0.118) (0.083) (0.297) (0.409) 
-0.137 -0.011 0.024 0.051 Small number of 
competitors (D)a) (0.148) (0.903) (0.586) (0.232) 





increased (D)a) (0.527) (0.708) (0.126) (0.387) 
0.312*** 0.498*** 0.337*** 0.450*** Market novelty (D)a) 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.120*** 0.113*** 0.098*** 0.087*** Innovation intensity 
(log)a) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 




expenditure (D) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
-0.058 -0.141* 0.027 -0.042 Type of 
innovation  
Process innovator (D) 
(0.481) (0.079) (0.500) (0.274) 
0.034 0.112 0.091 0.011 Cooperation with 
businesses (D)a) (0.771) (0.295) (0.112) (0.830) 
0.250** 0.309*** 0.294*** 0.387*** 
Open 
innovation 
practice Cooperation with 
research (D)a) (0.019) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
-0.039 -0.033 -0.019 -0.028 Credit rating (index, 
lagged) (0.473) (0.524) (0.480) (0.296) 
0.055 0.027 0.060 0.020 High profit margin 
(lagged)a) (0.586) (0.779) (0.213) (0.664) 
0.032 0.062 0.023 0.025 
Financial 
constraints 
Low profit margin 
(lagged)a) (0.789) (0.617) (0.704) (0.670) 
-0.143*** -0.125*** -0.090*** -0.047** Age (log # years) 
(0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.014) 
0.075** 0.156*** 0.089*** 0.166*** 
Controls 
Size (log # employees) 
(0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Applies to (no. of observations) 823 541 4,043 2,906 
No. of observations (total) 1,246 1,246 5,857 5,857 
1) Secrecy or patenting of low, medium or high effectiveness. 
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level. D: dummy variable. 
a) Missing values for these variables have been set to 0 and indicators were added to indicate this data change. 
All models include 15 sector dummies and an indicator for the survey wave used. 
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Table 12: Determinants of secrecy and patenting being highly important for protecting a 
firm’s innovation / IP: results of bivariate probit models (estimated coefficients, 
significance levels in brackets) 
  Firms with a single innovation All innovators 










0.465* 0.972*** 0.545*** 0.926*** Share of innovators 
with patents (0.097) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.034 0.026 0.038** 0.043** 
Strength of IP 
Law 
Share of out-licensed 
patents (0.204) (0.380) (0.011) (0.017) 
0.130 0.168* 0.048 0.057 High technological 
uncertainty (D)a) (0.148) (0.080) (0.223) (0.196) 
-0.368*** -0.266** -0.036 -0.181*** Large no. of 
competitors (D)a) (0.002) (0.043) (0.475) (0.003) 
-0.048 -0.062 0.004 0.078* Small number of 
competitors (D)a) (0.609) (0.547) (0.923) (0.092) 





increased (D)a) (0.779) (0.705) (0.055) (0.446) 
0.193** 0.330*** 0.244*** 0.308*** Market novelty (D)a) 
(0.036) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.047 0.093*** 0.073*** 0.096*** Innovation intensity 
(log)a) (0.150) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 




expenditure (D) (0.022) (0.048) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.082 -0.171* 0.099*** -0.068 Type of 
innovation  
Process innovator (D) 
(0.325) (0.066) (0.010) (0.118) 
0.129 0.258** 0.027 -0.010 Cooperation with 
businesses (D)a) (0.229) (0.020) (0.584) (0.855) 
0.319*** 0.063 0.293*** 0.305*** 
Open 
innovation 
practice Cooperation with 
research (D)a) (0.002) (0.564) (0.000) (0.000) 
-0.075 -0.016 -0.055** -0.020 Credit rating (index, 
lagged) (0.177) (0.793) (0.042) (0.511) 
0.453*** 0.100 0.101** 0.102* High profit margin 
(lagged)a) (0.000) (0.373) (0.030) (0.051) 
0.043 0.155 0.019 0.132** 
Financial 
constraints 
Low profit margin 
(lagged)a) (0.736) (0.264) (0.741) (0.041) 
-0.104** -0.038 -0.107*** -0.044** Age (log # years) 
(0.025) (0.451) (0.000) (0.041) 
0.032 0.135*** 0.062*** 0.171*** 
Controls 
Size (log # employees) 
(0.362) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Applies to (no. of observations) 347 220 1,880 1,232 
No. of observations (total) 1,246 1,246 5,857 5,857 
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level. D: dummy variable. 
a) Missing values for these variables have been set to 0 and indicators were added to indicate this data change. 
All models include 15 sector dummies and an indicator for the survey wave used. 
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Table 13: Determinants of the effectiveness of secrecy and patenting for protecting a firm’s 
innovation / IP: results of ordered probit models (estimated coefficients, 
significance levels in brackets) 
  Firms with a single innovation All innovators 








0.396* 0.986*** 0.597*** 1.190*** Share of innovators 
with patents (0.086) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.031 0.011 0.035*** 0.021 
Strength of IP 
Law 
Share of out-licensed 
patents (0.188) (0.679) (0.008) (0.145) 
0.252*** 0.178** 0.093*** 0.076** High technological 
uncertainty (D)a) (0.000) (0.020) (0.004) (0.026) 
-0.226*** -0.199** 0.018 -0.073 Large no. of 
competitors (D)a) (0.008) (0.043) (0.653) (0.102) 
-0.095 -0.024 0.009 0.072* Small number of 
competitors (D)a) (0.227) (0.770) (0.800) (0.051) 





increased (D)a) (0.501) (0.668) (0.084) (0.457) 
0.243*** 0.409*** 0.280*** 0.373*** Market novelty (D)a) 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.083*** 0.108*** 0.079*** 0.094*** Innovation intensity 
(log)a) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 




expenditure (D) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.019 -0.157** 0.063** -0.070** Type of 
innovation  
Process innovator (D) 
(0.780) (0.031) (0.046) (0.038) 
0.106 0.168* 0.061 0.010 Cooperation with 
businesses (D)a) (0.251) (0.063) (0.142) (0.809) 
0.239*** 0.216** 0.275*** 0.344*** 
Open 
innovation 
practice Cooperation with 
research (D)a) (0.005) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) 
-0.061 -0.018 -0.044** -0.023 Credit rating (index, 
lagged) (0.146) (0.685) (0.045) (0.334) 
0.218*** 0.053 0.072* 0.056 High profit margin 
(lagged)a) (0.009) (0.547) (0.057) (0.164) 
0.040 0.082 0.024 0.075 
Financial 
constraints 
Low profit margin 
(lagged)a) (0.677) (0.457) (0.619) (0.136) 
-0.122*** -0.101** -0.099*** -0.053*** Age (log # years) 
(0.001) (0.011) (0.000) (0.002) 
0.057** 0.161*** 0.074*** 0.174*** 
Controls 
Size (log # employees) 
(0.040) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. of observations 1,246 1,246 5,857 5,857 
1) measured on a 4-point Likert scale: not used, low, medium, high effectiveness. 
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level. D: dummy variable. 
a) Missing values for these variables have been set to 0 and indicators were added to indicate this data change. 
All models include 15 sector dummies and an indicator for the survey wave used. 
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Table 14: Determinants of the relative importance of secrecy over patenting for protecting a 
firm’s innovation / IP: results of ordered probit models (estimated coefficients, 
significance levels in brackets) 
  Firms with a single innovation All innovators 
















-0.444** -0.646*** -0.385*** -0.699*** Share of innovators with 
patents (0.043) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.023 0.019 0.018 0.014 
Strength of IP 
Law 
Share of out-licensed 
patents (0.230) (0.435) (0.117) (0.313) 
0.069 -0.014 0.019 -0.006 High technological 
uncertainty (D)a) (0.301) (0.853) (0.528) (0.849) 
-0.056 -0.042 0.077** 0.086* Large no. of competitors 
(D)a) (0.489) (0.659) (0.043) (0.057) 
-0.092 -0.063 -0.048 -0.043 Small number of 
competitors (D)a) (0.222) (0.465) (0.162) (0.255) 





increased (D)a) (0.997) (0.896) (0.514) (0.527) 
-0.125* -0.247*** -0.061* -0.152*** Market novelty (D)a) 
(0.099) (0.002) (0.068) (0.000) 
-0.011 -0.043 -0.004 -0.018 Innovation intensity 
(log)a) (0.643) (0.119) (0.705) (0.161) 




expenditure (D) (0.592) (0.423) (0.097) (0.368) 
0.122* 0.162** 0.096*** 0.121*** Type of 
innovation  
Process innovator (D) 
(0.051) (0.029) (0.001) (0.000) 
-0.043 -0.067 0.051 0.031 Cooperation with 
businesses (D)a) (0.639) (0.501) (0.225) (0.475) 




research (D)a) (0.788) (0.678) (0.109) (0.007) 
-0.044 -0.017 -0.019 -0.013 Credit rating (index, 
lagged) (0.264) (0.664) (0.340) (0.587) 
0.114 0.179** 0.004 0.023 High profit margin 
(lagged)a) (0.129) (0.038) (0.910) (0.559) 
-0.022 -0.010 -0.047 -0.062 
Financial 
constraints 
Low profit margin 
(lagged)a) (0.817) (0.928) (0.313) (0.241) 
-0.039 0.019 -0.043*** -0.020 Age (log # years) 
(0.221) (0.640) (0.003) (0.240) 
-0.073*** -0.105*** -0.073*** -0.097*** 
Controls 
Size (log # employees) 
(0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. of observations (total) 1,246 880 5,857 4,314 
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level. D: dummy variable. 
a) Missing values for these variables have been set to 0 and indicators were added to indicate this data change. 
All models include 15 sector dummies and an indicator for the survey wave used. 
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Table 15: Determinants of the combined importance of secrecy and patenting to protect a 
firm’s innovations / IP: results of probit models (estimated coefficients, significance 
levels in brackets) 
  Firms with a single innovation All innovators 














0.919*** -0.508* 0.508 0.830*** -0.317*** 0.681*** Share of inno-
vators with patents (0.001) (0.051) (0.168) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 




licensed patents (0.228) (0.749) (0.083) (0.022) (0.648) (0.308) 
0.202** 0.140* -0.046 0.078* 0.034 -0.019 High technological 
uncertainty (D)a) (0.033) (0.093) (0.697) (0.063) (0.373) (0.707) 
-0.123 -0.095 -0.067 0.036 0.029 -0.241*** Large no. of 
competitors (D)a) (0.326) (0.361) (0.670) (0.525) (0.543) (0.001) 
0.045 -0.184** 0.033 0.160*** -0.120*** -0.116** Small number of 
competitors (D)a) (0.653) (0.042) (0.790) (0.000) (0.004) (0.032) 





increased (D)a) (0.145) (0.918) (0.368) (0.446) (0.839) (0.644) 
0.216** 0.029 0.449*** 0.281*** 0.017 0.241*** Market novelty 
(D)a) (0.024) (0.745) (0.000) (0.000) (0.668) (0.000) 
0.143*** -0.001 0.010 0.130*** -0.030** -0.029 Innovation 
intensity (log)a) (0.000) (0.973) (0.785) (0.000) (0.039) (0.125) 




expenditure (D) (0.000) (0.247) (0.895) (0.000) (0.057) (0.853) 
-0.095 0.078 -0.169 -0.065 0.073* -0.146*** Type of 
innovation  
Process innovator 
(D) (0.296) (0.319) (0.126) (0.116) (0.051) (0.004) 
0.194* -0.092 -0.024 0.079 0.046 -0.096 Cooperation with 
businesses (D)a) (0.071) (0.386) (0.873) (0.121) (0.362) (0.159) 
0.196* -0.067 0.079 0.363*** -0.154*** 0.045 
Open 
innovation 
practice Cooperation with 
research (D)a) (0.063) (0.495) (0.569) (0.000) (0.002) (0.489) 
0.013 -0.076 -0.015 -0.038 -0.017 0.027 Credit rating 
(index, lagged) (0.828) (0.136) (0.846) (0.189) (0.505) (0.438) 
0.204* -0.054 -0.148 0.114** -0.057 -0.036 High profit margin 
(lagged)a) (0.056) (0.576) (0.292) (0.021) (0.204) (0.562) 
0.099 -0.062 -0.001 0.024 -0.036 0.176** 
Financial 
constraints 
Low profit margin 
(lagged)a) (0.465) (0.603) (0.993) (0.703) (0.530) (0.017) 
-0.162*** -0.031 0.081 -0.086*** -0.026 0.026 Age (log # years) 
(0.001) (0.468) (0.194) (0.000) (0.160) (0.298) 
0.186*** -0.078** 0.028 0.198*** -0.108*** 0.029* 
Controls 
Size (log # 
employees) (0.000) (0.018) (0.519) (0.000) (0.000) (0.065) 
Applies to (no. of observations) 280 436 113 1,649 1,846 548 
No. of observations (total) 1,246 1,246 1,246 5,857 5,857 5,857 
1) Both patenting and secrecy are of medium or high importance. 2) Secrecy is of higher importance than patenting, and 
patenting is neither of high nor medium importance. 3) Patenting is of higher importance than secrecy, and secrecy is neither 
of high nor medium importance. 
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level. D: dummy variable. 
a) Missing values for these variables have been set to 0 and indicators were added to indicate this data change. 
All models include 15 sector dummies and an indicator for the survey wave used.  
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Table 16: The impact of secrecy and patenting effectiveness on innovation success: results of OLS models (estimated coefficients, significance 
levels in brackets) 





Cost reductions owing 





Cost reductions owing 
to process innovations 
 No lag 1 year lag No lag 1 year lag No lag 1 year lag No lag 1 year lag No lag 1 year lag No lag 1 year lag 
0.183 1.266** 0.506 0.329 -0.004 0.562 0.268* 0.392 0.229 0.864*** 0.156 1.018*** Secrecy, low 
effectiveness (D) (0.507) (0.013) (0.143) (0.564) (0.986) (0.301) (0.086) (0.146) (0.205) (0.003) (0.319) (0.002) 
-0.096 -0.157 0.517* 0.390 -0.124 0.122 0.276* -0.005 0.336** 0.555** 0.148 0.698** Secrecy, medium 
effectiveness (D) (0.704) (0.706) (0.095) (0.451) (0.613) (0.808) (0.054) (0.985) (0.034) (0.033) (0.295) (0.016) 
0.257 0.400 0.451 0.422 0.329 0.577 0.605*** 0.141 0.352** 0.697*** 0.432*** 0.937*** Secrecy, high 
effectiveness (D) (0.362) (0.319) (0.153) (0.418) (0.193) (0.265) (0.000) (0.546) (0.020) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) 
0.734** 0.565 -0.582* -0.983* -0.043 -0.731 0.557*** 0.346 0.065 -0.230 0.074 -0.142 Patenting, low 
effectiveness (D) (0.013) (0.238) (0.092) (0.079) (0.867) (0.153) (0.000) (0.163) (0.694) (0.386) (0.624) (0.644) 
1.145*** 0.734 0.275 0.423 -0.152 1.702*** 0.899*** 0.608** 0.207 0.217 -0.253* 0.183 Patenting, medium 
effectiveness (D) (0.001) (0.143) (0.415) (0.439) (0.576) (0.005) (0.000) (0.019) (0.195) (0.397) (0.091) (0.579) 
0.996*** 1.153** -0.203 0.010 -0.576** -0.144 1.343*** 1.119*** -0.010 0.076 0.084 0.379 Patenting, high 
effectiveness (D) (0.001) (0.024) (0.545) (0.985) (0.020) (0.801) (0.000) (0.000) (0.953) (0.758) (0.579) (0.244) 
0.119 0.151 0.348*** 0.776*** 0.471*** 0.533*** 0.441*** 0.526*** 0.750*** 0.965*** 0.693*** 0.835*** Size (log # 
employees) (0.152) (0.248) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.128 0.235 0.041 0.045 0.008 0.054 0.018 -0.118 0.084 0.254*** -0.094* -0.008 Age (log # years) 
(0.184) (0.180) (0.750) (0.835) (0.937) (0.778) (0.735) (0.227) (0.154) (0.006) (0.074) (0.939) 
0.242*** 0.271** 0.207** 0.286* 0.129* 0.285** 0.297*** 0.272*** 0.262*** 0.295*** 0.202*** 0.358*** Innovation 
intensity (log)a) (0.001) (0.016) (0.022) (0.061) (0.061) (0.046) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
-1.830*** -1.985** -1.319* -3.685*** -0.727 -2.681*** -2.042*** -2.285*** -1.127*** -2.884*** -1.672*** -2.551*** No innovation 
expenditure (D) (0.000) (0.015) (0.058) (0.000) (0.157) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.948*** 1.562*** -0.389 1.244*** 0.528*** 0.244 1.093*** 1.118*** 0.466*** 1.416*** 0.252** 0.739*** Continuous R&D 
(D)a) (0.000) (0.000) (0.132) (0.010) (0.009) (0.597) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) (0.004) 
No. of observations 1,033 363 1,033 360 1,033 257 4,662 1,676 4,662 1,648 4,662 1,229 
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level. D: dummy variable. a) Missing values for these variables have been set to 0 and indicators were added to indicate this data change. 
All models include 15 sector dummies and an indicator for the survey wave used. 
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Table 17: The impact of the relative difference of secrecy over patenting effectiveness on innovation success: results of OLS models (estimated 
coefficients, significance levels in brackets) 





Cost reductions owing 





Cost reductions owing 
to process innovations 
 No lag 1 year lag No lag 1 year lag No lag 1 year lag No lag 1 year lag No lag 1 year lag No lag 1 year lag 
-0.148* -0.196 0.080 0.007 0.125* -0.009 -0.103*** -0.168*** 0.056 0.067 0.073** 0.091 Relative importance 
of secrecy over 
patenting (index) 
(0.056) (0.113) (0.326) (0.960) (0.051) (0.954) (0.009) (0.010) (0.164) (0.286) (0.049) (0.242) 
0.151* 0.178 0.362*** 0.811*** 0.454*** 0.525*** 0.517*** 0.575*** 0.766*** 0.998*** 0.708*** 0.895*** Size (log # 
employees) (0.070) (0.188) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.082 0.212 0.033 0.042 0.013 0.017 -0.026 -0.141 0.074 0.238** -0.102* -0.037 Age (log # years) 
(0.399) (0.241) (0.796) (0.847) (0.887) (0.928) (0.621) (0.150) (0.206) (0.010) (0.054) (0.723) 
0.298*** 0.308*** 0.229*** 0.308** 0.115* 0.326** 0.367*** 0.316*** 0.277*** 0.325*** 0.216*** 0.417*** Innovation intensity 









-2.600*** -2.655*** -1.262*** -3.158*** -1.776*** -3.007*** No innovation 
expenditure (D) 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.034) (0.000) (0.199) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1.138*** 1.834*** -0.318 1.352*** 0.505** 0.632 1.380*** 1.281*** 0.528*** 1.510*** 0.311*** 0.908*** Continuous R&D  
(D)a) (0.000) (0.000) (0.206) (0.004) (0.012) (0.168) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) 
No. of observations 1,033 363 1,033 360 1,033 257 4,662 1,676 4,662 1,648 4,662 1,229 
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level. D: dummy variable. 
a) Missing values for these variables have been set to 0 and indicators were added to indicate this data change. 





Table 18: Impact of using secrecy and patenting on firm profitability: results of interval 
regression models (estimated coefficients, significance levels in brackets) 
 Firms with a single innovation All innovators 
 No lag 1 year lag No lag 1 year lag 
-0.603 1.210 -0.180 0.758* Use of secrecy only (D) 
(0.320) (0.142) (0.545) (0.062) 
-0.899 1.619 -0.554 -0.545 Use of patenting only (D) 
(0.438) (0.293) (0.287) (0.440) 
-0.215 -0.221 0.100 0.364 Use of both secrecy and patenting (D) 
(0.716) (0.779) (0.726) (0.347) 
1.191* 1.684* 0.548* 0.988*** Valid trade marks (D) 
(0.086) (0.080) (0.051) (0.009) 
-0.509*** -0.339 -0.151** -0.403*** Size (log # employees) 
(0.006) (0.163) (0.041) (0.000) 
0.100 0.418 0.186* 0.403*** Age (log # years) 
(0.689) (0.220) (0.089) (0.010) 
0.259 -0.177 0.037 0.554 Market novelty (D) 
(0.700) (0.841) (0.904) (0.188) 
0.042 0.281 -0.107 0.283 Product imitation (D) 
(0.945) (0.732) (0.711) (0.476) 
1.039** 1.436** 0.544** 1.006*** Process innovation (D) 
(0.037) (0.035) (0.016) (0.001) 
-0.048 0.448** 0.098* 0.252*** Capital intensity  
(€ per employee, log)a) (0.690) (0.024) (0.071) (0.004) 
-0.144 -0.515*** -0.307*** -0.420*** Intense competition (index) 
(0.138) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. of observations 974 531 4,399 2,265 
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level. D: dummy variable. 
a) Missing values for these variables have been set to 0 and indicators were added to indicate this data change. 
All models include 15 sector dummies and an indicator for the survey wave used. 
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Table 19: Impact of the relative difference in the effectiveness of secrecy and patenting on 
firm profitability: results of interval regression models (estimated coefficients, 
significance levels in brackets) 
 Firms with a single innovation All innovators 
 No lag 1 year lag No lag 1 year lag 
0.069 0.407* 0.045 0.289*** Relative importance of secrecy over 
patenting (index) (0.694) (0.091) (0.571) (0.008) 
1.160* 1.903** 0.577** 1.045*** Valid trade marks (D) 
(0.094) (0.047) (0.038) (0.006) 
-0.500*** -0.326 -0.141* -0.383*** Size (log # employees) 
(0.006) (0.182) (0.056) (0.000) 
0.119 0.411 0.184* 0.400** Age (log # years) 
(0.633) (0.224) (0.091) (0.010) 
0.196 -0.114 0.049 0.625 Market novelty (D) 
(0.764) (0.893) (0.872) (0.129) 
-0.024 0.340 -0.115 0.312 Product imitation (D) 
(0.968) (0.675) (0.689) (0.429) 
0.998** 1.463** 0.543** 1.001*** Process innovation (D) 
(0.045) (0.032) (0.016) (0.001) 
-0.036 0.408** 0.101* 0.259*** Capital intensity  
(€ per employee, log)a) (0.767) (0.039) (0.063) (0.003) 
-0.144 -0.516*** -0.306*** -0.422*** Intense competition (index) 
(0.139) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. of observations 974 531 4,399 2,265 
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level. D: dummy variable. 
a) Missing values for these variables have been set to 0 and indicators were added to indicate this data change. 
All models include 15 sector dummies and an indicator for the survey wave used. 
 
 
